Military and Political Relations in South-East Asia: The Complexity of Two plus One Alliance (Japan, South Korea and USA) and A Threat To Mainland China and The DPRK

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Abstract: The twilight of Second World War has seen a change in the global political relations among the global big powers which also shaped the international political alliances and relations. Using the secondary method of data collection, findings show that Japan has come to see the United States as untouchable and a must befriend nation in order to remain safe in international politics. China, due to its rising nature in economic power, military might and its global influence, it is becoming a threat not just to Japan, but even to the United States. On the other hand, the DPRK is struggling to survive on its own against US and South Korean aggression. The paper concludes that, for peace to reign in the region, the United States must pursue peaceful diplomatic solutions and cease provocative military drills with South Korea. The paper recommends a clear intervention of the international court of justice in solving the problems of south and east china seas.

Keywords: alliance; relations; complexity; mainland china; military; south-east Asia

INTRODUCTION

This paper focuses on the nature of political alliance that exists between the United States of America and Japan; United States and South Korea; and the threat of such relations to china and North Korea. One notable factor so important, is that, the two states have been leading the world economy for quite long time, not until now that china is economically faster than ever, growing. The U.S.-Japan alliance is of particular importance to U.S. security interests. It is regarded as the “foundation of U.S. engagement in Asia,” and “the linchpin of the U.S. security strategy in Asia” [1].

The U.S.-Japan alliance is the strongest of the military alliances in the region and the hub of the U.S.-led military network of alliances. Japan provides the U.S. with major military bases, and, as such, is a basic prerequisite for U.S. military presence in Asia. In addition, Japan furnishes 70% of the military expenses for the American troops stationed in Japan, something rarely found in other host countries. It is quite natural that the U.S. pays special attention to its security alliance with Japan [1].

In September 1997, the U.S. and Japan completed revisions to the Guideline for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. Japan has acquired a position similar to that of U.S-NATO allies. The armies of the two countries can now use each other’s military bases and installations, thus improving logistical and supply capacity as well as enlarging their range of movement. Japan will furnish direct support and services for U.S. forces’ activities, in the form of logistical supports (equipment, parts, fuel, transportation, repair and maintenance), medical supplies and services, security, communications, additional ports and airfields, port services, and the like. Japan also will cooperate by providing assistance in search and rescue, maritime interdiction, minesweeping, air, sea and space management, and intelligence in times of crisis. Despite these changes the United States and Japan maintain that their Joint Declaration on Security has not altered the framework of the treaty [1].

Asian countries, however, cannot help but feel deeply worried about these revisions. The emphasis of the alliance has shifted from defending Japan to keeping security in the region, and there is ambiguity with regard to the scope of the treaty’s application. The treaty will be invoked when something happens in “the areas surrounding Japan.” It is, however, not clear which areas are "the areas surrounding Japan." The Chinese, quite naturally, are most concerned about Taiwan. According to the U.S. 1998 East Asia Security Report, the “situation in areas surrounding Japan” [1] embodied in the revised Guideline is not geographical but situational. Japanese politicians send a different message. Some have said that the Taiwan Strait is included, while others have said otherwise. The
confusion causes suspicion among the Chinese. In addition, strengthening the military alliances, especially the U.S.-Japan alliance aggravates the fears and suspicions of the countries outside that system, thereby undermining efforts to build confidence among nations in the post-Cold-War era [1].

MATERIAL AND METHOD
The material used in this research is the secondary method of data collection. It involves the use of library literatures such as text books, journals, periodicals, newspapers, magazines and reports. The methodology has been supported by the realist project which sees the global order as anarchic in nature, and advocates that states must do all they could to acquire power. Realism is all about power, security and survival issues [2]. The relevance of the theory of realism to this topic under study is that, Japan and South Korea are looking for a supplementary power and security in the region, while China is trying to build up more power, and North Korea is building up power at the same time trying to survive.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Recently, the United States and Japan have been working together on the Theater Missile Defense system (TMD) in East Asia, which has caused new friction among Asian countries. The U.S. argues that the TMD is a defensive weapon aimed at countering the threat of North Korea’s missiles. China opposes the TMD, arguing that it is difficult to make clear distinctions between defensive and offensive weapons, and that some military technology can be used both defensively and offensively. Further, China believes the TMD will break the balance of terror, thus breaking the balance of power. Finally, as the U.S. develops the TMD, other countries cannot stand idly by. It will trigger a new arms race and launch the arms race into outer space. None of this corresponds to the general trend towards regional peace and stability in the post-Cold-War world [1].

Having said all that, the role of the U.S.-led military alliance system is not totally negative. In the modern era, the history of international relations in the region suggests that Japan’s rise as a military power was one of the major factors responsible for the region’s conflicts and wars. The post-war U.S.-Japan alliance has defined as generally acceptable to almost every country in the region, thereby resolving an issue that had troubled the region for a century [1].

There were still 135,000 U.S. armed forces in Asia when the Cold War ended. In 1990 and again in 1992 the Bush administration drew up plans to reduce American troops in the region over the course of the decade. During the first Clinton administration, however, the Pentagon worked out a new security strategy for the East Asia Pacific region which reaffirmed U.S. commitment to a stable forward presence in the region for the foreseeable future, at the existing level of about 100,000 troops (80,000 troops in Japan and the ROK and 20,000-30,000 naval forces in the West Pacific). The United States believes that these numbers are requisite to maintain a swift and flexible response to crises in this region and to global security crises, especially in the Middle East[1].

The U.S.-Japanese alliance according to Bruce[3]:

Has been a critical foundation of peace and stability in Asia and has helped further U.S. strategic interests worldwide. North Korea is a good example. Pyongyang’s launch of multiple missiles in July 2006 and its October 2006 nuclear weapons test underscored North Korea’s continuing threat to Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. Tokyo’s imposition of sanctions and support for punitive U.N. actions were instrumental in bringing North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks. Also in line with U.S. interests, Japan publicly identified China as a military threat for the first time in its December 2004 defense guidelines and declared in a 2005 white paper that its military must adapt to defend against it.

Tokyo has worked closely with the U.S. to deploy a ballistic missile defense system to defend Japan against North Korean missiles. Pyongyang’s overflight of Japan by a Taepo Dong-1 missile in 1998 spurred greater public support for a missile defense system, and North Korea’s 2006 launches led Tokyo to accelerate its plans. Tokyo has deployed Patriot Advanced Capability 3 land-based missiles to Kadena Air Base and the ship-borne Standard Missile 2 (SM-2) air defense system and has accelerated modification of four Aegis destroyers to accept improved SM-3 missiles and constructed Xband radar at Shariki air base[3].

Obviously Japan was fragile and vulnerable after the Second World War. This has made Japan to turn over her former obliterator (the United States) in order to seek for political fatherism from the US. Fifty years have passed since January 19, 1960, when Japan and the United States signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Among other things, the treaty pledges the United States to defend Japan and Japan to provide the U.S. armed forces with bases for
the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the region. When it was 50 years to the day after the Treaty was signed, Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and U.S. President Barack Obama each issued a statement underscoring the importance of the alliance. Prime Minister Hatoyama committed Japan to working with the United States to further deepen the relationship and said he would "like to present the people of Japan with the results of this work before the end of this year [4].

Top officials from both sides also issued a joint statement the same day. In it, Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates credited the alliance with playing "an indispensable role in ensuring the security and prosperity of both the United States and Japan [4]. This means the continuity of US fatherism on Japan, in disguise, for exchange of military bases. Could it be an exchange of security for the bases obliged by the US? There has been a series of demonstration by the Japanese for the removal of US military bases out of their islands, but the government of Japan is lobbying the citizens, so that, to avoid any political misunderstanding with the US.

The Changing Nature of US-Japan Alliance

Japan has later realized the enormity of subjecting herself under US custody and the so-called security alliance within the Pacific Rim. Japan considered her sovereignty, national interest and decided to make a shift. Xiaoxiong [4] has accounted for the rationale behind Japan's mandate towards making a shift in her alliance policy with the United States:

The U.S.-Japanese alliance, the cornerstone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region since 1950, is undergoing some major transformations. Ever since the landslide victory of the Democratic Party of Japan over the Liberal Democratic Party in Japanese national elections, new DPJ Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada and Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa, have been issuing remarkably provocative statements about Japan's alliance with the U.S. and the new DPJ leadership is articulating positions on major security issues that are significantly different from those of Washington.

In the position of Japan, however, the obedience shown to the United States deserve some accolades and the only way out of political alliance with the US is when the united states treat Japan with equal consideration. One day after DPJ's election victory, Mr. Hatoyama announced that "Japan has until now acted to suit U.S. convenience. Rather than doing so, Japan-U.S. relations should be on an equal footing so that our side can strongly assert Japan's will." Three weeks later, Foreign Minister Okada issued a policy statement saying "Under previous administrations, Japanese foreign policy was excessively dependent on the U.S. I want to develop a foreign policy which will be able to convey our own thinking. Priority should be given to Asia first, and then to the Japan-U.S. alliance." DPJ Defense Minister Kitazawa went one step further, describing the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement as "humiliating" for Japan [4].

Underlying these bold statements is DPJ leadership's plan to move further from the U.S. to develop a more Asian-centric strategy for Japan. Hatoyama feels that as a result of the failure of the Iraq war and the financial crisis, the era of U.S.-led globalization is coming to an end and that they are moving toward an era of multi-polarity. Japan's national goal is the creation of an East Asian Community; and that they (the Japanese) must not forget their identity as a nation located in Asia. He believes that the East Asian region must be recognized as Japan's basic sphere of being.

Recently, tens of thousands of Japanese protesters gathered in the city of Ginowan on Okinawa to demand that the U.S. Futenma Marine Corps Air Base be moved out of the region. While the Futenma Base may be the most pressing bilateral issue, there is plenty more: the new DPJ government has announced it will not renew Japan's 8-year-old Indian Ocean refueling mission that supports U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan; Foreign Minister Okada is pressing the U.S. to adopt a "no-first-use" nuclear weapons policy, 61 percent of the DPJ's Lower House members are favoring removing Japan from under the U.S. nuclear umbrella; and Mr. Hatoyama, and his Environment Minister Sakihito Ozawa, are criticizing the U.S. as "failed to make deep reductions in its greenhouse gas emissions [5].

The Case of Us-Korean Alliance

The longstanding U.S.-South Korea alliance, originally established during the early years of the Cold War as a bulwark against the communist expansion in Asia, has undergone a series of transformations in recent years. Since 1998, when political power passed for the first time from the dictatorial ruling party to the
political opposition, the United Democratic Party, successive UDP governments have steered a more independent course from Washington, sometimes leading to friction. During the tenure of President George W. Bush, the once solid alliance went through a difficult period.

Among the many issues that bedeviled ties was disagreement over how to handle Pyongyang’s erratic behavior, a generational divide in South Korea on the alliance and the U.S. military presence that underpins it, an ascendant China, and disagreements during bilateral trade negotiations. In 2007, the countries signed a bilateral free trade accord and agreed to a rearrangement of the military command structure that gives Seoul a greater say in its own defense. They also narrowed their differences on North Korea policy. In 2007, a conservative, Lee Myung-bak of the Grand National Party, won South Korea’s presidency, and his party followed up with victories in 2008 parliamentary elections, ending two decades of UDP dominance. Lee strongly supports the U.S. free trade agreement and takes a harder line on North Korea unlike his two predecessors[5].

When Japan lost control of Korea at the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union split the peninsula into two territories pending promised national elections, which never took place. Instead, after Moscow and Washington failed to agree on a way forward, the United Nations in 1948 declared the Republic of Korea (ROK), with its capital in Seoul, as the only legitimate government on the peninsula. The Soviets rejected that assertion, and in 1950, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) invaded. The United States, heading up UN forces, came to the aid of South Korea. War ensued until 1953, when a cease-fire froze the front line at roughly the thirty-eighth parallel [5].

In 1954, the United States and South Korea signed the ROK/U.S. Mutual Security Agreement, in which they agreed to defend each other in the event of outside aggression. In 1978, the two countries formed the Combined Forces Command (CFC), based in Seoul and with a U.S. general at the helm, to defend South Korea. “For decades it was the threat from North Korea that was the glue that held the alliance together,” says Donald P. Gregg, chairman of the Korea Society and former U.S. ambassador to South Korea. But the South, ruled largely by U.S.-backed authoritarian regimes until the 1990s, underwent a shift in attitude toward North Korea under liberal administrations from 1998 to 2007. President Lee has promised better ties with the United States[6].

One of the major reasons of US alliances in the Asia pacific as earlier noted is due her interest in economic benefits, free navigation and influence on the political processes of the region. But one of the distinctive differences between US alliance with Japan and that of South Korea is that, South Korea suffered from the US assisted war with North Korea and still sees the north as a great threat, while Japan needs friendship to forget about the Hiroshima and Nagasaki incidents. The south, however, has to develop militarily. In this respect, Jae-Jung [6] observes:

The Republic of Korea has rapidly increased its defense budget in recent years. Last year’s spending of 26.6 trillion won represents a twofold increase from ten years ago. Now the Ministry of National Defense projects an annual average increase of 7.6 percent to 53.3 trillion won by 2020, another doubling over the next decade. South Korea, notably, raised its defense spending at a higher rate than North Korea at a time when Seoul was taking a more conciliatory policy of engagement. While the Roh Moohyun administration increased defense spending ostensibly in response to its policy goal to build a more autonomous military, the U.S.-Korea alliance motivated and shaped South Korea’s military transformation.

According to realist conventional wisdom, a state allocates resources to the military as a means to provide for survival. Since the minimal goal of a state is its survival against potential threats, the amount of its spending is proportional to the level of threat it faces. A state in a benign strategic environment may keep its security expenditure at a minimum so it may allocate more resources to internal welfare, even if it may not be able to completely eliminate the military for fear that today’s friends should become tomorrow’s enemies.

But a state facing a clear and present danger is forced to spend whatever is necessary to defend against an external threat even at a great cost to internal welfare. While scholars note a dilemma a state faces in striking an optimal balance between guns and butter, they tend to agree that the higher the level of threat, ceteris paribus, the higher the defense spending. Richardson’s classic arms-race model uses external threat as a driver of arms race because one’s increase in military capability increases the threat perceived by a potential adversary, who then increases its own military strength [6].
Due to the so called induced security alliance, South Korea was having a massive dream of military industrial complex. In the 1990s North Korea was having serious difficulties, which turned into a massive starvation and an economic crisis in the latter half. Its military spending too showed a marginal increase in the early 1990s, only to fall precipitously in the latter half. But Seoul continued increasing its military spending as if it were indifferent to the relative and absolute decline of the North’s power. The increase is all the more puzzling because it was maintained even as the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments pursued rapprochement with the North. The two liberal governments, in fact, tripled South Korea’s defense budget from 9.9 billion won in 1998 to 28.6 billion won in 2008, just when Pyongyang was struggling to survive. The South’s continuous increases in the 1990s and early 21st century, defies the external threat explanation[7].

The military-industry sector was not to be slighted. In 1991 there were eighty-four defense contractors designated as “defense industry” by the Ministry of National Defense, and hundreds of subcontractors, with total sales of 1.7 trillion won. By 2008 the number of defense contractors grew only slightly to eighty-nine, and they produced 1,442 defense products, with total sales of 5.5 trillion won. From the mid-1970s to 1991, military industries had invested a total of 1.2 trillion won in facilities and equipment; if dual-use facilities are included, the total is 3.3 trillion won. As of 1991, defense contractors employed 53,000 personnel. Even if the dual industries are excluded, the number is still about 28,000.10 The MND typically allocates one third of its budget for armaments[7].

In 1991 alone, the ministry, through the Defense Logistics Agency, spent 2.9 trillion won on local purchases, of which contracts with Korean defense firms represented “a substantial proportion.” Foreign purchases amounted to 590 billion won, of which over 60 percent were FMS (foreign military sales) purchases from the United States. The government was not just the sole consumer of military goods; it was also the major source of funding for defense contractors. In 1996, for example, the MND set up the “Defense Industry Promotion Fund,” through which it disbursed 52.3 billion won to thirty defense contractors as research and development (R&D) assistance. In the same year, it also provided defense contractors with loans worth 30.3 billion won [8].

WHY US-KOREAN MILITARY ALLIANCE?

It is very clear that the diplomatic relation that exists between the United States and South Korea has been cemented by long lasting support which Seoul continues to enjoy more than other states in the region. Some of the reasons why there is such a strong American-Korean military alliance are as follows:

Alliance as a Supplement

Other scholars have elaborated on the baseline realist account to take into consideration the effect that a military alliance has on a country’s defense budget. Their studies usually note that an alliance has a dampening effect because it aggregates resources. Several scholars explain alliance formation in terms of the lowest cost choice between arms and alliance on the basis of the assumption that an alliance reduces one’s military cost by replacing at least some of one’s own defense expenditures. There are two ways to assess the contribution that a country makes to its ally's defense [9].

One can either calculate the resources allocated for the ally’s defense or, counterfactually, estimate the marginal increase in the resources that the ally would have to spend if it lost the country’s support. The former is better at counting tangibles such as the number of soldiers and weapons systems deployed in or for the ally, and aggregate them to calculate the total support the country gives to its ally. While it may be easier to count the tangibles, the intangible contributions that a country makes to its ally’s defense may be more important and expensive in some cases. Either way, the total defense contribution is seen as reducing the ally’s security burden by that amount.

Using the first yardstick, we may estimate the total sum that the United States expends to support South Korea’s defense. One rudimentary estimate would take the number of American soldiers stationed in Korea as an indicator of the proportional slice of the U.S. defense budget if indirect costs, such as expenses on strategic forces and R&D, can be assumed to proportionately support each soldier. According to one estimate, the combined U.S.-South Korea expenditure totaled about $12 billion in 1986. Since South Korea alone spent approximately $5 billion that year, Washington contributed about $7 billion worth of force. Others estimate that one third of the U.S. defense budget goes to its forces in Asia-Pacific and therefore, by extension, to what the United States would deploy in case of a contingency in Korea[9].

If the cost is limited to the in-country expenses incurred by U.S. forces deployed in South Korea, however, the amount is a more limited $1.2 billion (as
of 2004), the figure used by the allied governments to figure out Seoul’s “host nation support.” Using the second, more indirect measure is more complicated for it involves counterfactual estimates. One needs to estimate the marginal increase in Seoul’s defense expenditure if the alliance were terminated. This in turn involves assessing two kinds of costs. First, if the alliance were terminated and the American military withdrawn, Korea would first have to fill the void with its own forces at its own cost. Some 40,000 American soldiers would have to be replaced with Koreans, and all the facilities manned by Americans would have to be managed by Koreans. These extra personnel would have to be paid, and the operating costs of the facilities would have to be borne by Seoul [10].

This is exactly the argument that the Ministry of National Defense made in its defense of the alliance[10]:

The U.S. Forces in Korea help us [Koreans] reduce our defense spending, which contributes to our continued economic development. If we take into account all the equipment and materials that the USFK maintains in-country as well as the several billion dollars it spends on maintenance and operations, its opportunity cost is tremendous. If the USFK should be withdrawn, it would take an astronomical amount of additional defense expenditures to compensate for its absence.

Second, if the alliance were terminated, it could potentially disrupt the flow of parts and materials, causing an incalculable disaster in equipment maintenance and production that might even compromise the ROK army’s readiness. The work of many of Korea’s defense contractors would grind to a halt as Korea failed to obtain necessary parts. Many U.S. contractors would lose customers. These secondary costs are difficult to estimate but are frequently used as a reason for maintaining the alliance. Typifying such justifications, Hwang Tong-Jun, Director of the Weapons Systems Research Center, has argued that, despite the need to diversify the sources of weapons imports, “we need to focus on our cooperation with the U.S., which has developed over the past 20 years and which has sustained weapons interoperability”[10].

In the 1950s and 1960s, Washington provided economic and military assistance, especially so-called counterpart funding not just as a supplement but also as an inducement for Seoul to raise the size of the military and defense budget. Even as President Richard Nixon withdrew one division from South Korea, he increased other types of defense assistance to compensate for the decrease in Korea’s defense readiness that might result from the force reduction. President Jimmy Carter threatened to cut U.S. aid if Seoul did not go along with his policy, but he ended up giving aid without any troop withdrawal. Through the 1970s, President Park Chung-hee, fearing American withdrawal, launched an ambitious program to build Korea’s independent military capability. But in the 1980s, when President Ronald Reagan made unqualified commitment to South Korea’s defense, President Chun Doo-hwan still went ahead with the military modernization program. In other words, South Korea kept beefing up its military regardless of the level of American Support[10].

This, in turn, raises the question about the degree to which U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) needs to be replaced in order to maintain a strategic balance against the North Korean military[10]. The Roh Moo-hyun government justified some of its new weapons development programs in terms of the need to substitute for the U.S. capabilities that would be withdrawn by 2012 when wartime operational control will be transferred to the ROKA, but it is at least questionable whether all of those capabilities need to be acquired by South Korea. For example, the Kumgang and Paektu Projects would, upon their completion, give the ROKA the ability to monitor North Korea’s military activities almost anywhere in the country.

Given that the North Korean military has only rudimentary reconnaissance and surveillance capability, any additional high-tech surveillance systems to replace what the United States currently provides could potentially be overkill. The ROKA maintains such a high force-to-space ratio that even without the benefits of the high-tech systems, it could block any blitzkrieg attempt by the North. Thus, while the U.S. military adds to the South’s capability, some of its contribution may be superfluous, especially given that Seoul is already enjoying military advantages over Pyongyang. The alliance’s supplementary effect, therefore, will be smaller than it seems at first [10].

Alliance as a Driver

The Costs of Interoperability While a military alliance as a tool of pulling security resources together reduces the defense burden for each ally, there are at least four reasons why an alliance may increase each member’s defense spending. First, the need to keep allied militaries interoperable generates pressure to allocate resources to meet the need for hardware, software, and human resources. Second, the political
need to keep an ally happy can lead to a provision of military aid or to the sale or purchase of weapons or commercial goods. Third, a country may be persuaded to maintain a level of force by its fear of abandonment by its ally at a time of crisis. “Abandonment fears” lead the allies to invest in making their links as unbreakable as possible.

Finally, a country may be dragged into a conflict in which its ally is involved. “Entrapment fears” reduce, if not counterbalance, the supplementary effect of the alliance to the extent that allies develop their capabilities independent of the alliance. Entrapment, of course, incurs direct costs of fighting as well as indirect costs of supporting the ally [11]. It is not easy or cheap to keep modern allied militaries interoperable, for interoperability requirements lead to three types of durable and expensive investments [11].

First, allies need at a minimum, to be able to identify each other, so as to minimize friendly fire and to coordinate their exercises and operations. Their weapons systems and platforms must be designed and produced to ensure interoperability between the allies’ assets. With further military integration, they need to ensure that both can rely on each other’s ammunition and POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants). Airports, ports, roads, and railroads may need be configured and maintained in order to enable an ally’s operation.

Second, the allied militaries need to customize the way allied militaries use equipment and manpower to achieve their joint objectives. The processes that require investment include consultation and coordination mechanisms, military planning, command structure, and the operation of combined forces and combined exercises. Alliance military practices are guided and governed by a host of rules, ranging from treaties and agreements to domestic laws and regulations, in addition to the standard operating procedures (SOPs) and rules of engagement that apply to most military activities. This software infrastructure represents another set of expenditures that allies make to carry out alliance obligations.

Third, costs are incurred by the need to move human assets in teams or train them to work together. Allies make a durable investment in alliance personnel so that they “learn by doing” or “learn on the job” about their allied partners, as well as about the alliance-specific hardware and software infrastructure. Alliance practices typically involve training about allies, combined exercises, and exchange of officers.

Allies also invest resources to educate soldiers about the history, culture, and politics of the ally as well as to teach at least some of them the ally’s language. If the interoperability requirements lead to these three kinds of investment, which add to a country’s defense spending, allies also have political needs to meet. On the one hand, the wealthier ally bears the burden of helping out its ally by providing military or economic assistance that will enhance the ally’s strength.

The more powerful ally may come under pressure to transfer weapons systems to an ally free of charge or at a “friendly” rate. These pressures were particularly strong during the cold war when the two superpowers competed with each other for allies. But even afterward, the strategic circumstances of, for instance, the global war on terrorism, have generated a need to invest in reconstructing the ally’s economy or military. On the other hand, the weaker of the two may purchase its ally’s weapons systems or other goods as a way to signal its commitment to the alliance or buy the ally’s interest. The powerful give what they can and the weaker buy what they must, to paraphrase Thucydides [12].

In this case, however, the cost of defense alliance is priceless. This is primarily because; each ally has an interest to protect in the process of the alliance, and each derives benefit from it. The best picture can be seen in the following submission [13]:

The Congressional goal for all cost sharing SMA is one subset was for the ROK to pay 62.5% of U.S. non-personnel stationing costs in Korea in 1999. The ROK actually paid $692 million out of $1.84 billion non-personnel stationing costs, or 38%. However, Korea still provided a substantial contribution compared to other nations when factoring in differences in gross domestic product... The SMA is an important milestone in the alliance and serves the interest of both the ROK and the U.S. It demonstrates the commitment of a strong combined posture in which the ROK cost sharing contributions directly finance a significant portion of USFK’s non-personnel stationing costs.

Finally, the United States seems satisfied with the current formula of burden sharing and South Korea appears willing to accommodate the wishes of its alliance partner. But is everything fine in the area of cost sharing? While the setup meets the goals and needs of the allies in actual costs disbursed, one should keep
in mind that it is not etched in stone. Today’s division of labor is the result of a long series of negotiations and it is subject to change as the future unfolds. Inasmuch as the alliance and cost sharing are influenced by shifts in the domestic, peninsular, and international environment, it would be an exercise in futility to analyze all the determinants. Nevertheless; a modest beginning is needed in order to devise a framework with which to prepare for future developments[13].

US-KOREAN ALLIANCE AFTER 9/11

With the aftermath of September 11 attack; the United States became highly preoccupied with security issues both nationally and internationally. The United States also tightened her relations with the countries she share common identity, what the constructivists may call threat free nations. On the other side of the relations, the US has condemned all countries regarded as threat to global security and peace, which means waging psychological or economic and political wars against such countries. But North Korea is never and exception of the countries regarded as threat to global security by the United States.

Despite the long period of political alliance with South Korea, the support of such alliance is now taking another different dimension. Seung believes that [12]:

Anti-Americanism is growing at a startling rate in South Korea, potentially escalating into a serious problem that could jeopardize the future of the U.S.-Korean alliance. Although previously limited to the concern of a minority of leftist nongovernmental organizations, student activists, and some liberals, anti-American sentiments have now spread into almost all strata of Korean society, ranging from the policymaking elite in the government and the intellectuals to members of the middle class and the younger generation.

Beyond its overall increase, the sources of anti-Americanism have become more complex and diverse. According to a recent public opinion poll, 63 percent of South Koreans have unfavorable feelings toward the United States, and 56 percent feel that anti-Americanism is growing stronger in the Republic of Korea (ROK). Unless Washington and Seoul work together on a course of action to counter this trend, these popular Korean attitudes could become a critical wildcard harming the future of the U.S.-Korean relationship[13].

Reasons for a Shift in the Public Interest of Koreans (Against Us-Korean Alliance)

Some of the reasons why the South Koreans want a change in the concurrent US-Korean alliance have been outlined by Chosen [13] when he wrote:

a. Following George W. Bush’s announcement of a new U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula in his January 29, 2002, State of the Union address, a new wave of resentment toward the United States hit South Korea. Bush’s denunciation of North Korea as part of an “axis of evil”54 and his threat to take preemptive actions against Pyongyang have angered many in South Korea, leading them to believe that the United States was escalating the possibility of a crisis on the peninsula as part of its global war on terrorism. Many Koreans felt that Bush’s new policy put South Korea’s security interests at risk and poured ice water on the country’s efforts to continue overtures with the North.

b. As memories of the Korean War fade and the threat from the North diminishes, long-standing resentment over the basing of 37,000 U.S. troops in South Korea only grows stronger. Issues surrounding U.S. bases, such as bnoise and environmental pollution, Yongsan’s location in midtown Seoul, and the Status of Forces Agreement, have rankled Korean pride and offended notions of sovereignty. An accident in June 2002, in which two middle-school girls were struck and killed by a U.S.-armored vehicle participating in a training exercise in Uijongbu City, 25 miles north of Seoul, further exacerbated Korean ill will toward the United States. The United States’ insistence soon after the incident that “no one was at fault” was perceived as an extension of U.S. arrogance and even seemed degrading to the Korean people.

c. The negative image of the United States portrayed by the media further exacerbates anti-American sentiment in South Korea. Media reports often climate in which the United States can be criticized. An incident during the 2002 Winter Olympics held in Utah—when Korean short-track skater Kim Dong-sung lost to Apollo Anton Ono, a U.S. contender, as a result of a controversial ruling by an Australian judge—was an example in which the media coverage inflamed resentment toward the United States.

d. Korean anger intensified when NBC’s “Tonight Show” host Jay Leno made the racially
discriminatory remark, as he defended the referee’s decision at the Winter Olympics, which “the Korean player had been angry enough to have kicked and eaten a dog when he returned home.”

South Korea’s major television networks repeatedly aired Leno’s comments, accompanied by negative comments on U.S. attitudes, while condemnation and protests against the United States flooded the Internet and spread throughout the country. In an unprecedented move, some Koreans even started an anti-American campaign by boycotting U.S. products, including F-15E fighter aircraft and Coca-Cola, as well as franchised U.S. restaurants.

e. Korea’s changing demographic structure is also a major factor in the rise of anti-Americanism. Members of the generations involved in the Korean War and the Vietnam War, in particular, have an emotional tie to the United States, based on shared Cold War experiences. This generation is aging, however, and constitutes a diminishing percentage—21 percent—of South Korea’s population. Two-thirds of the country’s population is under the age of 40, and younger Koreans’ attitudes toward the United States are knotty. They recognize the importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance for their security against North Korea, but they are reluctant to tolerate perceived U.S. arrogance and U.S. political as well as economic domination. In addition, they have a more negative image of the United States’ status as the world’s only superpower. Because they tie U.S. political and economic domination to the presence of U.S. forces in South Korea, younger Koreans increasingly want to see a significant reduction of U.S. forces in South Korea or even a complete withdrawal.

f. “Ideological anti-Americanism” has existed among a small minority of urban leftists and extremists from academia, the press, labor unions, and churches in South Korea for quite some time. In the 1980s and into the 1990s, these groups, influenced by the North Korean political ideology of Juche (self-reliance), openly displayed their anger toward the United States through violent street protests and made demands that were often identical to those made by North Koreans, including the expulsion of U.S. forces from the South. These protests largely failed to penetrate the general public in South Korea. The groups’ activities dissipated following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the evident failure of the DPRK system over the past decades. Now, however, these groups serve to exacerbate the problem by instigating and taking the lead in organizing anti-American activities in South Korea.

g. Scarring episodes of U.S. disloyalty reach even further back than the last decade. In 1905, through a secret agreement between U.S. secretary of war William H. Taft and imperial Japan’s Prime Minister Count Katsura Taro, Koreans believe that the United States sold out Korea to Japan by approving Japan’s domination over Korea in return for Japanese approval of U.S. domination in the Philippines. The United States blatantly disregarded the 1882 bilateral U.S.-Korean treaty, in which the United States promised to provide “good offices” in the event of an external threat.

h. Many Korean intellectuals also believe that the United States holds responsibility both for the outbreak of the Korean War (1950–1953) and the division of Korea. In their view, Korea’s division was driven by U.S. suppression of popular and leftist movements during the military occupation of 1945–1948. Then, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea in 1949, followed by then-Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s announcement in January 1950 that South Korea would be outside the U.S. defense perimeter in the Asia-Pacific region, openly invited Communist aggression from the North in June 1950. Yet, at the same time, they appreciate and recognize the United States as a liberator after World War II and as their savior during the Korean War. Today, however, Koreans are skeptical and believe that, if necessary, the United States may abandon South Korea again in favor of U.S. global strategic interests.

i. A rise in anti-Americanism might be a component in the natural path of South Korea’s graduation from a client state to a dynamic and vibrant member of the international community. Korean self-confidence and national pride have grown commensurately with increasing sophistication, economic success, and international prestige exemplified by its membership in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, its growth into the twelfth-largest economy in the world, its hosting the 1988 Summer Olympics, and its co hosting the 2002 World Cup with Japan. These developments have led Koreans to question some of the country’s past practices, values, and relationships; to seek greater political and security independence from the United States; and to demand a more equal partnership and mutual respect in the bilateral relationship.
j. To be fair, however, anti-Americanism is probably rising because nationalism is increasing both in South Korea and the United States. U.S. nationalism is influenced by the country’s status as the sole global superpower, while Korean nationalism grows as the country becomes more industrialized. Koreans are satisfied with an alliance with the United States as well as with U.S. leadership in the international community, but they increasingly emphasize the value of national pride, equality in the relationship, and greater independence from the United States.

CONCLUSION

The cross-states alliances and the problems or tension attached to them can be ameliorated only when the united states begin a sincere peaceful diplomatic process in the region. The rivalry in the south East Asia region involves the closest of neighbors: China versus Japan; South Korea versus North Korea. Peaceful diplomatic process here may involve relations on equal basis, albeit constructivist analogy sees that almost impossible, due to the principles of identity, commonality and interest.

RECOMMENDATION

The paper recommends the following as part of the remedies to the problems arising from political, border, strategic and economic issues:

- The international court of justice must intervene in the current tension among the claimants of the spratly islands of the South China Sea as well as the new tension between China and Japan. To redefine the boundary lines on the eats china sea.
- China must continue to consolidate its own efforts towards economic build up, which will later give it more power to counter-balance the American influence on the region.
- China must also carryout a more friendly relations with South Korea, for the two Koreas to avoid more dangerous enmity between themselves.
- Japan must also avoid some provocative gestures especially the type that could make her neighbors furious, especially the main land china.
- North Korea should continue to establish more reliable relations with Seoul, in order to avoid suspicion, tension and mistrust between the two Koreas.

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