Working of Jemaah Islamiya: A Radical Trajectory from 2000-2009
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Abstract: The article explains the rise of the radical group, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Southeast Asian archipelago which gave a remarkable boost to the explosion of radical religious discourse. This terrorist group is selected because, unlike the challenges and terrorism of the past in the region, it represents the origin of the first terrorist organisation that is so well connected with other terrorist groups. The paper is divided into five parts- the ideology, epicentre of recruitment, structure, network and operations of JI which provides basis for its connectivity with other like-minded movements or organisations in the region. In order to understand the nature of the JI’s working in Southeast Asia, a brief examination of JI’s ideological foundation that provides material resources to regenerate itself is also required.

Keywords: Jemaah Islamiyah, Southeast Asia, Terrorism, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Indonesia and Abdullah Sungkar.

INTRODUCTION
Since the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York City, on 11 September 2001, the world has been facing one of the greatest challenges of the worldwide terrorism. It gave a significant international attention to non-state terrorist groups in Southeast Asia, the most prominent of which is, Jemaah Islamiya (JI). Ethnic and religious violence in Southeast Asia escalated to another level in terms of intensity throughout the last five hundred-plus years. Today, radicals adopting an ideal of universal jihad (struggle against the enemies of Islam) have induced the regional religious conflict in Southeast Asia. They have manipulated the legacy of violence into a campaign against the West and its allies. Dramatic events such as the 12 October 2002 Bali bombings and connections to both World Trade Centre attacks displayed the effectiveness of efforts by certain radical elements within Southeast Asia to promote the goal of universal jihad. Recent analyses into the operations of these radical groups provided a picture of a loose, trans-national web of like-minded organizations that apart from sharing ideology also shares information, funding, facilities, training and personnel [1].

The inheritance of religious intolerance that provides the grounds for the current Southeast Asian Islamic movement gained momentum after the Second World War with the birth of Darul Islam (Islamic State) rebellions in Indonesia, led by Kartosuwirjo. The goal of Darul Islam was the creation of an Indonesian Islamic state, and the movement was responsible for several uprisings through the 1950s and 1960s in Indonesia [2]. Although was suppressed and forced to operate underground during the late mid-1960s, several armed militant organizations formed from the group in the mid to the late 1980s, one of these was Jemaah Islamiyah [3].

Jemaah Islamiyah was founded sometime in 1992 or 1993 by former members of Darul Islam, the two key Islamic clerics – Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir while hiding in Malaysia from the persecution of the Suharto government [4]. They founded a religious school which propagated extremist views. Subsequently, they began setting up a sophisticated organisation structure and operational bases with the aim for seeking independent Islamic states in Southeast Asian region. In the mission to fulfil their objective of creating an independent Islamic state, JI have planned and carried out various violent attacks.

By keeping these dimensions in mind, the paper will focus on the key elements which make JI as the most violent group in the discourse of terrorism in Southeast Asia. JI has emerged in the 21st century to be more violent and fragmented than at any time in its post-colonial history.

Radical Islamist Ideology
JI ideology refers to the comprehensive and mutually consistent set of ideas by which JI makes sense of the world [5]. In their understanding of Islam,
JI preaches the need to practice Islam in its totality, which is referred to as “Islam Kaffah” [6]. But contrary to that throughout the history JI ideology showed a remarkable ability to adapt it to changing circumstances, to incorporate new ideas and to apply it to new strategic and political ends. The key leaders of JI, such as Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Hambali, Abu Jibril among others appeared to have undergone transformation as far as their ideology was concerned. They were essentially followers of Darul Islam and wanted to realize the dream of creating Indonesia as an Islamic state, however, overt ime, their goal expanded to convert Southeast Asia into an Islamic region.

Adherents of radical Islamic ideologies are a small minority in Indonesia [7]. There were always a tendency toward more orthodox and Sharia-based forms of Islam and periodic attempts to introduce more radical interpretations of the religion.

Rise of Wahhabism played a very crucial role in increasing the ability of radical Muslims in Southeast Asia. Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the religious founder of the Wahhabiyya movement (Wahhabism), opposed any form of innovation in Islam, and called for a return to the roots of Islam [8]. He opposed to any sort of religious innovation or reform in Islam. He developed an ideology eliminating any distortion and believed that jihad could also be carried out against any Muslim who did not support his belief. It is a late-18th century Islamic movement that provides the foundation of the teachings going on at thousands of Madrassas (Islamic educational institution) in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and elsewhere. Their conservative teachings show that Islam has found a great appeal on the population of Indonesia [9]. There was always a tendency toward more orthodox and Sharia-based forms of Islam and periodic attempts to introduce more radical interpretations of the religion.

One of the major event in the latter half of the 20th century that was further responsible for the spread of radical Islamic ideology and development of an international terrorist network was the Soviet-Afghan War from 1979-1989. All the key figures of the rebellion from Southeast Asia went to Afghanistan to participate in the Soviet -Afghan war and experience the glory of defeating the Soviets. In Afghanistan, they were taught sophisticated terrorist craftsmanship and expertise. After returning to Southeast Asia, they transferred the skills to other members and shared their experiences of training in Afghanistan.

The crucial role played by Wahhabi Madrassas can’t be underestimated here. Madrassas provide the ideological front line and primary breeding grounds for the potential members. The main problem is that in many parts of the Southeast Asia, a Saudi-backed Madrassas is the only form of education available to young men. Students, who seems to be open to their ideology are identified and further indoctrinated. Radical organisations have misused these Islamic Schools to preach their extreme form of hatred for the West.

Thus, the worldwide Islamic revival and the arrival of funds and ideologies from the Middle East provided the foundation for the growth of Islamic radicalism in Southeast Asia in the recent past. This funding allowed extremist groups to distract the trajectory of the largely moderate system of Indonesian religious education.

JI ideology is deeply conservative, opposing democracy or a female head of the state as incompatible with Islam. The most important motivated factor for JI operatives was perhaps religion. Religious text was often quoted to educate and motivate JI’s member. In JI, they wanted to provoke many to call for jihad by using Islam as a weapon. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, one of the key figures in JI, was of the view that the radical discourse is the morality of force to further the goals of Islam and to promote its good image. According to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir:

Defending Islam is both a duty and obligation. While death is certain, yet there are different kinds of death. Some are of low or high quality and others somewhere in the middle. For Islam, the highest value of death comes to a person when he/she dies a martyr or matisahid. Undertaking suicide is forbidden by Islam as this is done by people who have lost all hopes in living. However, a martyrdom death is highly valued and prized. When one dies for Islam, one gets closer to god as his chosen one. This is what all jihadists strive for and is permissible in Islam. Since the day of the prophet, the idea of dying for Islam was to weaken the enemy, both directly and indirectly. As long as these goals are achieved, than death is not in vain. It is highly valued and hence, should be both encouraged and praised. It emanates from higher intensions and ideals with the sole purpose of getting closer to god and to defend the Islam in the face of attacks from its enemies.

PedomanUmum Perjangan Al-Jama’a’ah Al-Islamiyah (PUPJI) offers insights into the basic concept of JI ideology. The importance of PUPJI is undeniable for throwing light on the radical ideology of JI.
Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Jama'ah Islamyah (PUPJI)

The “General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah” (PUPJI), JI’s charter and operating manual, outlines the religious principles and administrative aspects underlining JI’s primary objective of establishing, through armed struggle, an Islamic state in Southeast Asia. In order to understand the gradual evolution, procedural norms, rules of engagement, targeted outcomes operations and decision making process of JI, it is very important to have a vivid understanding of PUPJI. This document not only provides us with the goals and modus operandi of the group but it also gives us the insider’s outlook into the structure and motivation of JI.

Issued by JI’s central executive council (Qiyadah Markaziyah), it outlines the group’s administrative structure and guiding religious principles, in addition to providing insights into its organisational development, membership, recruitment and operational strategy [11]. PUPJI is a booklet written in a combination of Bahasa Indonesia and Arabic languages. It has 15 chapters along with preamble, constitutional explanation and conclusion. It approximately comprises of around 44 pages. PUPJI also focussed on terrorist justification for the use of violence, that various aspects of JI’s constitution, a constitutional charter is also included, with the aim of clarifying the group’s norms and procedure, chains of command, and decision making processes (Nidhomul Asasiy) [12].

In the introduction of the PUPJI, the central leadership council of JI wrote that god has outlined a number of set principles for mankind to lead their lives: first, the aim of man’s creation is to worship Allah alone, consequently all worldly possessions, time, energy and thought must be channelled towards this end [13]. Second, human existence on earth is to serve as God’s vice-gerent [14]. In means that, man is required to prevent, eliminate all acts of corruption which falls outside the domain of God’s law.

Third, life on an earth is a test to filter and sieve members of the human race in order to determine who has performed the best deeds, which are judged based on two fundamental requirements, namely sincerity towards God and emulating the prophet in life’s endeavour [15].

Fourth, the apostles of god were sent by him to establish the Dien. The meaning of ‘establishing the Dien’ or ‘Iqomatid Dien’, according to the exegetes (Mufassirun), is to establish a way of life based on the unity of God (Tauhid) which relates to establishing Islam in all its aspects, as explained by the companion of the prophet Muhammad, Abdullah bin Umar, in his commentary of the Surah al fateh, which according to him include Aqidah (Islamic creed), Ibadah (act of worship) and Mahajul-hayah (way of life) [16].

The general manual focuses on four stages of operation—planning, execution, reporting and evaluation. In the document lot of importance is also placed on education period in Madrassas according to which it enlightens the members and inculcates the skills of discipline, physical strength, and weapon and leadership development.

Epicentre of JI recruitment: Kinship, Friendship, Madrassas and Mosque

JI is a leading terrorist organization which is very selective in its membership, yet finding recruit is not a problem for the member of JI. Connections cannot be easily broken even after few years of no contact with JI members. Individuals may become inactive but they rarely take a conscious decision to leave the Jemaah, and if the superior asks a favour, it is difficult to say no [17]. There are four major epicentre of JI recruitment: kinship, Madrassas and mosque.

The superb analysis of Jones and the ICG has concluded that these kinship ties, including marital ties are the single most important determinant of membership in JI [18]. Family relationship and marriages in JI is a complex web which became the main basis for recruitment. The impeccable lineage of one’s wife enhances a member’s standing with the organisation and increases his network potential [19]. The technique of using sibling relationships in jihadi recruitment is also adopted to provide further ideological support for the recruits beyond the group itself. It is believed that, sometimes two or more brothers are recruited for jihad, helping each other during an operation and providing each other constant encouragement. In this context of regenerating JI, Father and son relation is also important. Some members of the group also went to Afghanistan for getting training urban warfare. This particular type of recruitment is effective to ensure deeper engagement with the cause and group.

Madrassas is another major epicentre of JI recruitment in Southeast Asia. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, one of the prominent leaders if JI founded Al-Mukmin, widely known as Pondok Ngruki. Al-Mukmin is considered as one of the main institutions committed to radical ideas and graduates of this school became the most well-known names in Southeast Asian terrorism. In all, there is a network of some 60-100 madrassas that Indonesian security believes are centres if JI recruitment, most of which are run and staffed by Ngruki alumni or veterans of the afghan mujahidin [20]. Established slowly and methodically, these madrassas include Mutaqin Jabarah in Central Java, Darulisyahadin

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and the Madrassalqumnullahi kiemin Kelantan, Malaysia and the Hidayatullah network, through east Kalimantan and south Sulawesi, which is where many of the Bali bombers were hiding when they were arrested [21].

Mosque is another centre for the recruitment of this group. JI look for Muslims of certain age coming regularly to Mosque for prayers. They are then invited to private study sessions, in which they are slowly indoctrinated. This further involves many stages over years in which their commitment and religious understanding is tested and evaluated.

Structure of Jemaah Islamiyah

Since JI’s inception in 1992-93 till 2000, it has concentrated mainly on recruiting, indoctrination, training and building up nationwide networks of cells with specific functions and didn’t engage in any of the activities. JI has formed an integral part of the ‘leaderless’ organisation, while at the same time basing its inner workings on a commander-cadre cellular organisation [22].

JI was based hierarchy with well-defined responsibilities and decision making procedures. JI is led by an Amir, or spiritual leader. Abdullah Sungkar was the first Amir of JI. Following his demise in 1999, the position was believed to have been passed out to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. After Ba’asyir became more active in Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), the charge was eventually taken over by Abu Rusdan.

In carrying out his duties, Amir is assigned by the Majlis Qiyyadah (leadership council), Majlis Syuro (Consultative council), Majlis Fatwa (Fatwa council), and Majlis Hisbah (Hisbah council), MajlisMantiqiyah (Mantiqi leadership council) and Majlis Qiyyadah Wakalah (Wakala leadership council). The spiritual leader (Amir), a leadership council (Markaz) and consultative councils (Shura) managed four geographic divisions (Mantiqi). Each Mantiqi divided into smaller sub-groups, which administered Jemaah Islamiyah activity appropriate to their area [27].

There are four Mantiqi’s in JI. Mantiqi I deals in Malaysia, Singapore, Sumatra and southern Thailand, Mantiqi II operates in Java, Sumatra, Bali, other islands of Indonesia, Mantiqi III is active in Philippines, Kalimantan, Borneo, and Sulawesiand Mantiqi IV operates in Australia and Papua.

Mantiqi are comprised of operational elements called Wakalah controlled by a Qoaid Wakalah. The Wakalah represents an intermediate level of authority that provides command and control for JI operatives active within a specific location or region.

Mantiqi I (M1): Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Sumatra

The oldest organization within JI is Mantiqi I. It was organized and managed by Hambali until mid-2002. He was forced to go into hiding by the Singapore Internal Security Division (ISD) disruption of Operation JIBRIL. Till 2009, M1 was headed by Noordin Top, a Malaysian born and a leading “bomb expert” for JI.

The Malaysian branch of M1 is the largest formation within JI and has an estimated 200 members [23]. Five primary functions have been identified and associated with the Malaysian branch: initial indoctrination and training of new personnel, coordination of jihad activities for the Maluku region, establishment and management of front companies, procurement of weapons and bomb making material, and liaison with its legal affiliate, Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) [24].

Indoctrination and Training was carried out at a JI facility in Negri Sembilan, Located in southern Malaysia. The facility used to provide initial indoctrination before sending they would be sent on for military training in Afghanistan. Abu Jibril coordinated jihad activities for the JI. Jibril was a passionate recruiter for jihad in Maluku and Ambon. Haji Ibrahim bin Haji Maidin, the qoaid Wakalah in Singapore during Operation JIBRIL, was an early recruit of Jibril [25].

Singapore Branch—Until his arrest in December 2001, the Wakalah in Singapore was led by a local condominium manager named Haji Ibrahim bin Haji Maidin [26]. He worked towards instilling a high degree of discipline and operational security awareness in his recruits. Before they were sent to Afghanistan for Al-Qaida training, each of the recruits passed through the Negri Sembilan camp. At least two of the Singapore operatives, Fiah Musa members Mohammad Ellias and Mohammad Nazir, were nominated for specialized training in one of three areas: ambush and assassination operations, sniper operations, or field engineering. The Singapore Wakalah was disrupted in December 2001 by the Singapore ISD because of its activities in support of Operation JIBRIL.

The Thailand branch of M1 recently came into the spotlight with the arrest of Arifin bin Ali, alias John Wong Ah Hung, on 16 May 2003 and Maisuri Haji Doloh, his son Muyahi Haji Doloh, and Waemahadi Wae Dao on 10 June 2003. They were charged for plotting attacks on tourist locations and foreign embassies throughout Thailand. Arifin bin Ali was a member of the Singapore Wakalah who fled the country after the collapse of Operation JIBRIL.
Mantiqi II (M2): Indonesia (except Sulawesi and Kalimantan)  
Abdullah Anshori is the qa'id Mantiqi II. He is a long-time associate of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir who was arrested for radical Islamic activities in the 1980s.

Mantiqi holds responsibility over most of Indonesia beyond its connection with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir MMI. It came to light through information gathered through information gathered though interrogation of captured Bali bombing suspects. M2 was majorly involved in anti-Christian activities in Ambon and Maluku.

Mantiqi III (M3): Borneo, Sarawak and Sabah, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, Southern Philippines
The main function for M3 was its coordination with Moro Islamic Liberation front training bases in the southern Philippines. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s run MILF camp in the provinces of Mindanao was the major central point for JI training from 1995 until the Philippines army overran it in 2000.

Mantiqi 4: Australia and Papua
The latest organization within the JI is M4 it is subordinated to M2 in Java. The Australian Wakalah has conducted extensive fund-raising campaigns to procure arms and material. Abdul Rahmin Ayub is thought to be the qa'id Wakalah in Australia. Ayub and his family left Australia for Indonesia shortly after the 12 October 2002 bomb attacks in Bali.

JI spent lot of time in creating the groundwork for laying sustainable environment. Many of the cells are sleeper cells or agents. This means that the individual within the cell are waiting to be activated [28] Meanwhile they lead normal lives, far from any connection with terrorist activities. This is what makes individual of a cell so hard to detect and one may say they live undercover [29].

Jemaah Islamiyah’s domestic partners and linkages

Laskar Jihad (LJ)
LJ is one of the biggest and best organised militant groups with 52 branches throughout Indonesia. LJ was founded by Jafar Umar Thalib in 2000, which spent several years studying in Pakistan and also took part in Soviet Afghan War in the late 1980s. In fact, LJ emerged as the largest and best organized groups sending voluntary jihad fighters to the Moluccas [30].

There is a vast similarity in the goals and ideology of JI and LJ. The links between the two radical groups came to limelight with the conflict that started in Maluku since 1999 between Christians and Muslim that claimed thousands of lives. The LJ has regularly received attention since 2000 for persistent attacks on Christian populations on both the islands. Apart from Maluku, LJ was also engaged in the violence against Christian in Poso (Sulawesi) in 2001 and West Papua.

Laskar Jihad makes no secret of its ultimate ambition, which is to reform or transform all of Indonesia into an Islamic state a theocracy under the leadership of the clergy based on full implementation of sharia [31]. Jafar Umar Thalib acknowledges that his group has ties with terrorist organisations like, JI and Malaysia based Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM). Laskar Jihad was established as an extension of the special division of FKAWI, whose headquarters were located in Yogyakarta, with provincial and district branches scattered in almost every Indonesian Province [32].

Laskar jihad caught the public eye when it held a spectacular gathering at the Senayan Main Stadium in Jakarta in early April 2000, which was attended by about ten thousand participants, this gathering decided the “disaster” afflicting Maluku Muslims, who were perceived as being threatened by genocide [33]. LJ’s members classified Christians as Kafir or infidels. They are considered as the most dangerous community by Muslims, which give them the basis to kill them. LJ was founded to be backed by military hardliners who wished to undermine the post-Suharto reformist government of Abdurrahman Wahid as he was considered by them as anti-Islamic. They further were of the view that his government was placed to oppress Muslim interests and protect those of the infidels.

Laskar Jandullah
Laskar Jandullah has been closely associated with a group that supports JI, namely Komite Persiapan Penegakansyariat Islam (KPPSI) or the preparatory committee for upholding Islamic law directly led by Agus Dwikarna [34]. The membership of Laskar Jandullah was believed to have been drawn from three sources; Muslims from the Poso Area, relatives or
supporters of Darul Islam rebellion, and a faction of the Indonesian Islamic student organisation (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam).

Laskar Jandullah gathers about 2000 recruits to central Sulawesi. Mostly using bats and machetes, they support local Muslims in violent conflicts with Christians near the town of Poso, which have been occurring off and on since 1998, with heavy casualties on both sides [35].

Laskar Mujahidin (LM)

The first commander of LM was Habib Muhammad Rizieq Shihab. He encourages young Muslims to take up weapons. This videotape was distributed throughout Indonesia, Malaysia and southern Philippines and was shown during informal religious classes by clerics with alleged ties to JI.

This group works closely with JI and is offered referred to as the “armed forces of the Ngruki network” [36]. There are many separate operations taken by LM focussing on the Muslim/Christian struggles in Ambon and Maluku. LM main focus is on ethnic Christian issues inside Indonesia. Therefore, the prime objective of LM is to ensure a steady supply of work for those who are not as concerned with Western encroachment as much as they are with domestic issues.

Front Pembela Islam (FPI)

FPI and its militant group, Komando Laskar, were founded in 1998 by Habib Muhammad Rizieq Shihad and KH Misabul Anam at Pesentren at al-umm ciputal in south Jakarta [37]. The main objective of this organization is to take an active role in improving and maintaining faith of Muslims as well as to build an appropriate infrastructure that is in line with Islamic Shariah.

FPI is believed to have several thousand members spread across 22 provinces, through the capital Jakarta, constitutes its principal area of strength and major theatre of operation [38]. The key figures of the group demanded an end to diplomatic relations with United States. The FPI has an extensive network of Islamic religious schools and organization as well as numerous councils.

The FPI activities were temporarily frozen after the arrest of Rizieq in 2002, but violent attacks were resumed shortly in 2003. FPI was further accused for attacks in Playboy's office in Jakarta, Indonesia on April 2006. It was followed by an unsuccessful public call for disbanding the group. The group again came in limelight on June 2008 with the arrest of FPI leader Habib Riziq Shihab.

Mujahidin Kompak

The Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akitat Krisis (KOMPAK) is based in central Sulawesi, was established in 1998 under the guidance of DDII to provide relief assistance to people in conflict areas like Kalimantan, the Moluccas, and Central Sulawesi. KOMPAK formed as a splinter group from JI. The reason for their separation is the alleged bureaucratic nature of JI. Unlike JI, whose main focus is on religious indoctrination, KOMPAK focussed to prepare their members to fight by providing them training.

In 2003, many KOMPAK members were arrested by Indonesian forces in violence and terrorism. After Indonesian forces crackdown, KOMPAK broke into several small cells [40]. But, this didn’t stop the organisation from their task of radicalisation. KOMPAK gives support to JI and paramilitary organisations and doesn’t engage themselves in conflicts directly.

REGIONAL PARTNERS AND LINKAGES: MALAYSIA

Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM; Malaysian Mujahidin group)

The Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM) was founded in 1995 by Zainon Ismail. The Islamic goal of the group was of forming an Islamic state in Southeast Asia and identified the secular government of the region, as its primary enemies.

The KMM is a radical group which is reported to have networks in the Malaysian states of Kuala Lumpur, Perak, Johor, Kelantan and elsewhere [41]. The KMM is been accused of planning to wage a jihad, threaten Malaysian National Security, possession of weaponry, bombings and violent attacks on foreigners.

The group also has close ties to radical Indonesian Islamic group, JI. There is a close association in the goals, objective and ideology of the two groups. With JI’s guidance and support, KMM has been successfully able to spread its influence and augment beyond Malaysian borders [42]. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Spiritual head of JI, supposedly has provided spiritual guidance to KMM members.

The KMM emerged publically in mid-2001 when Malaysian authorities used the internal security act to round up and detain several people they were

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involved in a plot to topple the Mahathir’s government by force [43]. Several of the detained militants of the group, accepted to have undergone military training in Afghanistan and some fought in Soviet Afghan war.

PHILIPPINES
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
The collaboration between JI and MILF is most prominent in the area of training. Sometime in 1997, MILF allowed JI to set up its own training facility within camp Abu bakar. This camp was known as camp Hudaybiyya and was run by Indonesian JI members.

The MILF was formed in 1977 when Hashim Salamat, supported by ethnic Maguindanaos from Mindanao, split from the Moro National Liberation Front, advocating a more moderate and conciliatory approach toward the government [44]. Salamat among others had a close connection with JI leaders, which has supported the group in many ways despite having overlapping radical ideology. Evidence, including the testimonies of captured Jemaah Islamiyah leaders, has pointed to strong links between the MILF and JI, including the continued training of JI terrorists in MILF camps and the planning of terrorist operations [45].

Philippine government officially accused MILF operatives for tarnishing the peace of the country by bombings different places in Manila. While, MILF always deny any involvement and claim that bombings were committed by splinter groups not under their control.

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is an Islamic terrorist group, founded in the early 1990’s in the southern Philippines under the leadership of Abduraza Abubakar Janjalani. The objective of the group is to promote an independent Islamic State in Muslim dominated areas of western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. The ASG is driven by its traditional base of support on Basilan island to Mindanao where it has made common cause with JI members.

THAILAND
Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani (GMIP)
The Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani (GMIP) is perhaps the most significant violent group operating in the lower South of Thailand. After Bali attack, Thai police tighten up its inspection and arrested many members of this radical group. Thai police, in June 2003, arrested three Thai Muslims, as well as one from Singapore, some of whom later admitted to be members of Jemaah Islamiyah. Thai military intelligence sources suspect that, in the attempts to annex southern Thailand, Kumpulan Mujahdeen Malaysia, based in Terengganu, helped to revive the local separatist groups GMIP and Barisan Revelusi Nasional (BRN). With support from the Malaysian militants, GMIP and BRN have been transformed into insurgency groups with a regional agenda departing from their past goal of carving out a Pattani state.

SINGAPORE
Al-Jama‘ah Al-Islamiyyah
Al-Jama‘ah Al-Islamiyyah, is the Singapore JI branch which was started by Ibrahim maidin, a religious teacher. He was inducted into Jemaah Islamiyah in 1988-89 by Abu Jibril, who was then a religious preacher who frequently taught in Singapore [46]. Ibrahim maidin took the bai‘ah under Ba‘ayir and was subsequently appointed as the leader of JI in Singapore [47]. The presence of this group came to light when the Singapore authorities caged 13 members of the group that were planning to take on a series of bombing in Singapore.

Malaysia's Al-Ma‘unah, in Malaysia, Laskar Jihad in Indonesia, Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Muslim enclave of Mindanao in southern Philippines and Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani in southern Thailand were driven by a common goal of forming an independent Islamic states in their respective countries. Their goal formed an association with the goal of JI at a regional level, who provided all the necessary support and guidance to these groups.

Jemaah Islamiyah’s Operation
Abu Bakar had initiated this domestic and religious alliance with the hope that these radical groups could cooperate and share resources for training, indoctrination and financial assistance which would enable them to carry high profile terrorist attacks in the region.

After the fall of Suharto and Ba‘asyir’s return to Indonesia, Ba‘asyir concluded that the more open political environment in Indonesia offered opportunities to pursue the JI’s objectives through apparent as well as secret means. Around 1999 or 2000, the JI leadership stepped up efforts to recruit more JI members into the operations cells and to prepare them for military training.

The first clearly JI terrorist operation was likely to be the one mounted in December 2000 which involved the simultaneous bombing of churches in several Indonesian cities on Christmas Eve [48]. Approximately thirty more bombs were set to explode at the same time at Christian churches or the homes of clergy. Subsequently, Santa Ana church and Atrium Mall bombings among others took place on 22 July 2001 and 1 August 2001 respectively. The motive of these attacks was to stimulate conflict between Muslims and Christians. JI members, after 11 September 2001 Twin tower attack came up with a many plan to attack...
targets in Singapore, including the US and Israeli Embassies, the Australian and British missions and commercial buildings housing US firms.

Bali Bombing, February 2002

A meeting was held in February 2002 in Thailand between Hambali and several other key members, where the topic of attacking soft targets (bars and nightclubs) instead of hard targets (embassies) were discussed. Since April of the same year prominent leaders like Mukhlas, Amrozi, Imam Samudra and Dr. Amrozi started planning and made the decision to target Bali.

A suicide bomber exploded himself inside a bar along the beach in Bali on October 12, 2002, killing 9 people. As people fled out onto the streets in panic, another suicide bomber detonated a Van loaded with nearly 1000 kg of explosives in the middle of the quickly forming crowd [49]. With 202 civilians dead and approximately 100 wounded, the attack was considered as the worst terrorist incident in the history of Indonesia.

Spiritual leader of JI, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, was arrested after 7 days of the attack by Indonesian government. His arrest was followed by Amrozi’s arrest on 5th November in East Java where he admitted to be a part of the attacks. Later, Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the Bali attacks. On November 21st Police arrested the suspected field coordinator of the bombings, Imam Samudra, while trying to flee Malaysia, then on December 3rd Mukhlas, the older brother of Amrozi, was arrested [50]. Imam Samudra, Bali bombing mastermind, defended himself by saying that he had carried out god’s order to defend the weak against American terrorists and their allies.

J.W Marriott Hotel, Jakarta blast, August 2003

Despite Abu Bakar Ba’asyir arrest for the Bali bomb blasts, J.W Marriott Hotel bombing occurred on 5 August, 2003 in Jakarta, Indonesia. Indonesian authority was convinced that JI was responsible for the attacks as it bear similarity with Bali attacks. The secret team pursuing Jihad on its own was setup by Hambali. On 4 June 2003 the final team was put together comprising of –Noordin, Ismail, Azhari, Asmar Latin, Masrizal bin Ali and Luqmanuallahkiem.

On 20 July 2003, a Toyota was loaded with explosives and driven in front of the Marriott Hotel. As the security guard of the hotel approached the vehicle and talked briefly, Asmar triggered the bomb. It is still not clear if the explosion was accidental, set off by remote or exploded prematurely. The blast killed 11 people and injured 150. All those killed were mainly Indonesian with an exception of one Danish, one Dutch business and two Chinese tourists. Around 200 people were killed, given the lunchtime crowd in the adjoining coffee house.

The attack was followed by series of attack. On 15 August, U.S announced the arrest of Hambali in context of Bali bombings. On 9 September and 2 October 2003, Imam Samudra and Mukhlas were sentenced to death respectively. By taking this extreme step, Indonesian authorities wanted to send out the message loud and clear to everyone, that such terrorist activities would not be tolerated.

Australian Embassy Bombing, September 2004

On 9th September 2004, a nearly similar suicide truck bombing took place at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. The attack killed 11 people (including the suicide bomber) and wounded more than 180. Australian embassy staff escaped relatively unscathed in the suspected suicide attack, which ripped apart the heavily-fortified gates of the mission, shattered thousands of windows and left a deep crater in the road outside [51]. The Australian Embassy attack was led by Noordin Mohammed Top, who was one of the Asia’s most wanted men and prominent member of JI terror group.

The suicide bomber, himself remotely exploded the device. Embassy’s staff escaped relatively unharmed but it ripped apart the heavily-fortified gates. People killed were mainly Indonesians, including police and embassy security staff. The reason for choosing Australia Embassy as a target was due to its role in supporting US invasion of Iraq.

The Second Bali bombing, October 2005

On 1 October, 2005, a series of bomb exploded in Bali. The blasts were conducted on terrorist locations. One of the blasts struck at the shopping mall in central Kuta and another two bombs exploded along the Jimbaran beach and the Four Seasons Hotel. These areas are generally popular with Western tourists. Twenty three people (including 3 suicide bombers) were killed and more than 100 injured in these attacks. The chief suspect of the attack, Azahari Husin, was a prominent member of JI. He was killed in a police raid in a police raid in November 2005.

J.W Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotel bombings, July 2009

By 2009, Asia’s combination of multilateral cooperation, capacity building, popular support, and political will had resulted in significant progress in countering terrorism and in developing the institutions necessary to deprive violent extremists of exploitable grievances [52]. Despite that on July 17, suicide bombers affiliated with the remnants of the terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiya (JI) struck two hotels in downtown Jakarta within five minutes, killing nine and
injuring sixty more, ending a four year period without a major terrorist attack in Indonesia [53]. The first bomb was detonated at Marriott at 7:47 am at the lounge in the lobby, near a meeting of foreign business people. The second bomb was exploded at the Ritz Carlton hotel 10 minutes later, on the second floor restaurant. The bombing occurred barely two weeks after president Susilo Bambang Yudoyono won the presidential elections on 7 July 2009. The attacks was followed by lengthy and violent battle between Noordin and Indonesian police which eventually resulted in Noordin’s killing on 16 September 2009.

Although in the past few years, JI had lost some of its top leaders and several members, the group still remains dangerous as it is compounded by its development as a network that ignores national boundaries. It stretches over several countries in the region and has formed links with other Muslim extremist groups to further its goals. The various terrorist organisation in the region operating at varying levels of effectiveness, allows them to continue, which not only seem impossible in the foreseeable future, but may be assumed in the structure depicts that they have a regenerative capacity. Further, the ideology of JI plays a crucial role in providing a foundation and motivating factor for JI to redevelop itself. Despite the efforts of most of the governments in Southeast Asian region to counter terrorism, the ability of JI to spread and operate to form a sophisticated network for many years demonstrates the failure on the part of the governments to eradicate the menace of terrorism completely. It depicts that much is needed to be undertaken domestically and regionally in order to win the war against terrorism entirely.

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